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REBECCA E. ZIETLOW*
"[W]here [Congress] keeps within its sphere and violates no express
constitutional limitation it has been the rule of this Court, going back almost
to the founding days of the Republic, not to interfere."'
In politics and in academia, the Warren Court is virtually synonymous
with the term 'judicial activism." The many "activist" rulings of the
Warren Court expanding individual rights and the jurisdiction of federal
courts are the paradigmatic example of courts protecting the rights of
minorities. Yet this Article points out another side of the Warren Court's
jurisprudence-its restraint towards congressional power, especially when
Congress used that power to protect the rights of minorities in our society.
It considers the role of a particular set of rights: rights of belonging-
those rights that promote an inclusive vision of who belongs to the
national community and facilitate equal membership in that community. In
a series of landmark decisions articulating its deference to Congress, the
Warren Court invited and encouraged popular constitutionalism, enabling
members of Congress to use their own judgment in defining and protecting
rights of belonging. The Article argues that the strongest contribution that
the Warren Court made to expanding equality rights was not its judicial
activism in protecting those rights, but its restraint in allowing Congress
to protect those rights.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, opposing "activist judges" has become something of a
mantra for conservative politicians. Those on the political right most often
use the term "judicial activism" to refer to liberal judges striking down their
legislation. At the same time, constitutional scholars have engaged in a
parallel debate over the value of "popular constitutionalism," that is,
constitutional interpretation outside of the courts. 2 Advocates of popular
constitutionalism question the primacy of judicial review over constitutional
interpretation by the political branches, 3 while its critics maintain that
judicial review is necessary for stable and principled constitutional
interpretation. 4 These debates raise the age-old question of the appropriate
relationship between courts and legislatures with regard to individual rights.
Critics of popular constitutionalism maintain that an active judiciary is
necessary for the adequate protection of minority rights because equality
norms need protection from majority rule,5 and with few exceptions, even
2 See generally Larry D. Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, circa 2004, 92 CAL. L.
REV. 959 (2004) (describing that debate).
3 See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REvIEw (2004); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel,
Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the
Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 1995 n. 158 (2003).
4 See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Frederick Shauer, Defending Judicial Supremacy: A
Reply, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 455 (2000); Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Judicial
Review: A Reply to Professor Kramer, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1013 (2004).
5 See Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 1025.
[Vol. 69:255
RESTRAINT OF WARREN COURT
the staunchest proponents of popular constitutionalism agree.6 These
scholars support judicial activism as a means of protecting minority rights.
The many "activist" rulings of the Warren Court expanding individual
rights and the jurisdiction of federal courts are the paradigmatic example of
courts protecting the rights of minorities. Indeed, in academia and in politics,
the Warren Court is still synonymous with judicial activism.7 However, a
closer examination of the Warren Court's legacy reveals that that Court's
approach to equality rights was considerably more complex than this
paradigm suggests. There is another side to the Warren Court legacy-that
Court's deference towards congressional power. In a series of landmark
decisions articulating its deference to Congress, the Warren Court invited
and encouraged popular constitutionalism, enabling members of Congress to
use their own judgment in defining and protecting minority rights.8 Indeed,
the strongest contribution that the Warren Court made to expanding equality
rights was not its judicial activism in protecting those rights, but its restraint
in allowing Congress to protect those rights.
The Warren Court Era saw a marked expansion of "rights of belonging,"
those rights that promote an inclusive vision of who belongs to the national
community and facilitate equal membership in that community. 9 Based in
6 See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 2, at 997 (arguing that supporters of popular
constitutionalism should not be too cavalier about the fate of individual rights in a
democratic system); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism,
Departmentalism, and Judicial Supremacy, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1027, 1038 (2004) ("Yet to
allow the political judgment of the Constitution to dictate constitutional law is to risk
undermining the stability and reliability of the very constitutional rights that may express
and protect our values."). But see MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY
FROM THE COURTS 154-76 (1999) (arguing against judicial review).
7 But see THOMAS M. KECK, THE MOST ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY: THE
ROAD TO MODERN JUDICIAL CONSERVATISM 14 (2004) (positing conversations about the
Court too often equate judicial activism with the Warren Court); LUCAS A. POWE, JR.,
THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS (2000) (arguing that the Warren Court's
rulings were consistent with the politics of its time). For an interesting attempt to
differentiate the activism of the Warren Court from that of the Rehnquist Court, see Jack
M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L.
REV. 1045 (2001).
8 See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal
Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 495 (2000)
[hereinafter Post & Siegel, Equal Protection].
9 See Denise C. Morgan & Rebecca E. Zietlow, The New Parity Debate: Congress
and Rights of Belonging, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1347, 1392 (2005) (introducing the concept
of rights of belonging). For a more detailed discussion of the meaning and scope of rights
of belonging, see REBECCA E. ZIETLOw, ENFORCING EQUALITY: CONGRESS, THE
CONSTITUTION, AND THE PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 6-8 (2006) [hereinafter
ZIETLOw, ENFORCING EQUALITY]. The term "belonging" is most closely associated with
Professor Kenneth Karst, who has written extensively about equal citizenship. See
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equality, rights of belonging help to define and expand access to the
community in which we live by removing barriers to participation in that
community. ' 0 Both critics and supporters of the Warren Court often attribute
the expansion of those rights to that Court, whether condemning the Court
for illegitimately imposing its own will on the democratic process or
praising the Justices of the Warren Court as "countermajoritarian heroes"
protecting rights of "discrete and insular" minorities.lI Yet while the Warren
Court certainly was protective of rights of belonging, the Warren Court's
restraint towards Congress enabled that body to be equally protective of
those rights. Indeed, from the 1964 Civil Rights Act to the 1994 Violence
Against Women Act, Congress gave those rights more protections than did
federal courts.
Warren Court decisions such as Brown v. Board of Education12 provide
support for the argument that judicial activism is necessary for the adequate
protection of rights of belonging. Inspired by the Warren Court, many
scholars have argued that an active judiciary is necessary for the adequate
KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE
CONsTrrUTION (1989).
10 For example, civil rights legislation opens access to employment, education, and
other opportunities, and the right to join a union empowers workers to participate in their
workplace and in the political arena. In contrast, liberty interests, like the right to family
autonomy and freedom of speech, in and of themselves are not rights of belonging.
However, liberty-based rights can implicate equality-based rights. For example, the right
to marry is a liberty interest, rooted in individual autonomy, but it becomes an equality
interest when it is denied to one group of people based on immutable characteristics. See
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). This Article does not attempt to define all rights of
belonging, nor would it be possible to do so. The focus of this Article is on the process of
definition-indeed, participating in defining rights of belonging is itself an act of
belonging. See ZIETLOW, ENFORCING EQUALITY, supra note 9, at 167-68.
11 See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS, 16-23 (1962) (same); LEARNED HAND, THE
BILL OF RIGHTS: THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES LECTURES 73-74 (1958) (criticizing the
Warren Court); Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme Court 1963 Term, Foreword: "Equal in
Origin and Equal in Title to the Legislative and Executive Branches of the Government,"
78 HARV. L. REV. 143 (1964) (same); Owen Fiss, A Life Lived Twice, 100 YALE L.J.
1117, 1118 (1991) (praising the Warren Court); Michael J. Gerhardt, The Rhetoric of
Judicial Critique: From Judicial Restraint to the Virtual Bill of Rights, 10 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 585, 618 (2002) (same); David Luban, The Warren Court and the Concept of
a Right, 34 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 7, 7 (1999) (same). See also Michael J. Klarman,
Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1, 19 (1996)
(pointing out that many scholars think Brown proves that courts are "countermajoritarian
heroics" who protect minority rights).
12 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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protection the rights of "discrete and insular minorities."'13 Yet the little
known and understood truth is that throughout the history of our country,
proponents of rights of belonging have been more successful with politics
than with litigation. 14 Judicial restraint, not judicial activism, has always
been necessary for the healthy development of rights of belonging in this
country. 15 Not only has the Court rarely acted to protect rights of belonging
as the Warren Court did, but it has also rarely allowed congressional efforts
to protect those rights. 16 Understanding this, prior to the Warren Court Era,
progressives consistently advocated for judicial restraint, not judicial
activism. Since the Warren Court Era, the Supreme Court has returned to its
activist ways in its relationship to Congress, striking down congressional
efforts to define and protect rights of belonging. 17
In contrast to the Warren Court's deference to congressional power, the
Rehnquist Court was considerably more "activist" in its approach to that
coordinate body. The Rehnquist Court struck down a record thirty-three acts
of Congress from 1995 to 2003, compared to only seventeen during the most
activist period of the Warren Court.18 Moreover, while the Warren Court
13 A recent Lexis search uncovered 506 law review articles written in the past
twenty years advocating the proposition that courts should protect minorities against the
will of the majority. For just a few of the many prominent scholars supporting this view,
see JUDITH A. BAER, EQUALITY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION: RECLAIMING THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 281 (1983); CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTH OF
FREEDOM: HUMAN RIGHTS, NAMED AND UNNAMED 125 (1997); KARST, supra note 9, at
9. The term "discrete and insular minorities" is borrowed from Justice Stone's influential
footnote four in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
14 For a detailed account of this phenomenon, see ZIETLOW, ENFORCING EQUALITY,
supra note 9, at Ch. 3-5 (discussing the historical dynamics of congressional protection
of rights of belonging during Reconstruction, the New Deal, and the "Second
Reconstruction" of the 1960s).
15 Id.
16 Indeed, what most distinguishes the Warren Court may be the extent to which the
political process largely coincided with that particular Court's value preferences. See
generally POWE, supra note 7. I owe this thought to Michelle Adams.
17 See Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REv. 80
(2001).
18 According to Thomas Keck, that period extended from 1962 to 1969. See KECK,
supra note 7, at 40 (2004). From 1995 to 2003, the Court struck down an average of 3.67
federal statutes per year, more than double the average of the Warren Court. Id. The
earlier Rehnquist Court was considerably less activist, striking down only seven federal
statutes from 1986 to 1994, an average of 0.78 per year, making a total average of 2.35
per year. Id. The Warren Court struck down an average of 1.64 federal statutes per year
over its entire tenure, with an average of 2.29 per year during its most activist period,
1963-1969. Id. Of course, it is possible that the Rehnquist Court simply had more
opportunities to strike down federal statutes because there were more unconstitutional
federal laws to strike down. See Anna Harvey & Barry Friedman, Pulling Punches:
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invalidated only federal statutes "of little or no significance,"' 9 many of the
federal statutes invalidated by the Rehnquist Court enjoyed strong bi-
partisan support.20 Most importantly, while the Warren Court was most
deferential to Congress's power to define and protect rights of belonging, the
Rehnquist Court imposed its most rigorous scrutiny on such statutes.21 Yet,
as the Warren Court understood, when minorities win in the political
process, those victories are entitled to the maximum amount of deference by
the countermajoritarian courts. By definition repeat losers in the majoritarian
political process, discrete and insular minorities only achieve victories in
that process with intense effort and years of activism. 22 Their successful
struggle to obtain legislation that protects their rights deserves respect from
the courts in the form of deference to that legislation.
Underlying the debate over judicial activism is the question of what role
values should play in shaping the law, and which branch is best suited to
determine those values. Responding to "activist" decisions striking down
restrictions on abortion and gay marriage, political conservatives argue that
unaccountable judges should not be allowed to shape our values. 23 Put on
Congressional Constraints on the Supreme Court's Constitutional Rulings, 1987-2000,
31 LEGIS. STUDIES Q. 533 (2006).
19 L.A. Powe, Jr., The Politics of American Judicial Review: Reflections on the
Marshall, Warren, and Rehnquist Courts, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 697, 717 (2003).
20 See Mark A. Graber, Constructing Judicial Review, 8 ANN. REv. POL. ScI. 444
(2005). The most notable example is the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, invalidated
in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), which was approved virtually
unanimously; see also ZIETLOW, ENFORCING EQUALITY, supra note 9, at 2-5.
21 The Rehnquist Court applied heightened scrutiny to Commerce Clause-based civil
rights legislation in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), and a strict scrutiny-
like "congruence and proportionality" test to legislation enforcing the Fourteenth
Amendment. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520. Along with its decision in Morrison
invalidating the civil rights provision in the Violence Against Women Act, the Court also
struck down provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act. See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S.
356, 360 (2001); Kimel v. Fla. Rd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 67 (2000). See also
Appendix B. For an argument that the Rehnquist Court targeted certain types of civil
rights legislation, see Jed Rubenfeld, The Anti-Antidiscrimination Agenda, 111 YALE L.J.
1141 (2002).
22 For example, the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act were
congressional responses to years of struggle by civil rights activists. See Rebecca E.
Zietlow, To Secure These Rights: Congress, Courts, and the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 57
RUTGERS L. REv. 945, 957-61 (2005).
23 See Karen Branch-Brioso & Jo Mannies, D.C. Marchers Demand an End to
Abortions, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 23, 2003, at Al (activist Mary Marchmeier
says Roe v. Wade "was brought to you by a bunch of elitist judges who decided to usurp
the Legislature's authority"); Tim Poor, Ashcrofi Denounces 'Judicial Despotism' by
Federal Courts, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 6, 1997, at 5A; Mark Silva, Bush Backs
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the defensive, supporters of rights of belonging find themselves reflexively
defending courts as protectors of our values.24 Yet that approach is not only
counter-historical, there are strong institutional and policy reasons why
confining debates over values to the judicial process may have a harmful
effect on rights of belonging.
Legislation creating rights of belonging is likely to be more effective
than court rulings expanding those rights because the transparency and
accountability of the political process are more likely to foster popular
acceptance. Rights of belonging are more likely to flourish if they are part of
the ongoing political dialogue over values in our society. For those who
have historically lacked power in our society, participation in the political
process itself is also an act of belonging. An open dialogue about the
meaning and extent of rights of belonging is healthy for our civic society
because it provides a mechanism for dialogue about our fundamental values.
Judicial activism creates the danger of stifling that debate. 25 Thus, judicial
restraint, and not judicial activism, is likely to foster the most robust rights
of belonging.
Part II of this Article discusses the terms of the debate, defining judicial
activism and explaining its historical relationship to rights of belonging. Part
III summarizes the activism of the Warren Court in protecting individual
rights, and Part IV correspondingly illustrates that Court's restraint when
Congress acted to protect those rights. Part V contrasts the activism of the
Rehnquist Court in restricting congressional autonomy to protect rights of
belonging to the restraint of the Warren Court. Finally, Part VI discusses the
institutional reasons behind the importance of congressional autonomy to
protect rights of belonging. The Rehnquist Court's activism has led many
constitutional law scholars to reconsider their position on judicial review.26
Those of us who support the expansion of rights of belonging should
advocate judicial restraint.
Amendment on Marriage, CHI. TRIB., June 6, 2006, § 1, at 4 (quoting Bush as saying
"[aln amendment to the Constitution is necessary because activist courts have left our
nation with no other choice").
24 See Alliance For Justice, http://afj.org (last visited Apr. 2, 2008); National
Organization for Women, http://now.org (last visited Apr. 2, 2008).
25 See MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL
DISCOURSE 6 (1991); TUSHNET, supra note 6, at 169.
26 Cf, TUSHNET, supra note 6, at 154-176 (arguing against judicial review); Kramer,
supra note 2 (supporting the concept of "popular constitutionalism" or constitutional
interpretation outside of the courts); Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 1018-22 (arguing that
judicial review is necessary to protect minority rights); Post & Siegel, supra note 6, at
1038 ("Yet to allow the political judgment of the Constitution to dictate constitutional
law is to risk undermining the stability and reliability of the very constitutional rights that
may express and protect our values.").
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II. JUDICIAL ACTIVISM AND RIGHTS OF BELONGING
In today's political debate, the term "judicial activism" has become so
overused as to be practically meaningless. 27 Politicians and pundits seem to
invoke the term whenever they disagree with a court's decision. 28 Hence, it
is important to define the term at the outset. Black's Law Dictionary defines
"judicial activism" as "[a] philosophy of judicial decision-making whereby
judges allow their personal views about public policy, among other factors,
to guide their decisions, usually with the suggestion that adherents of this
philosophy tend to find constitutional violations and are willing to ignore
precedent. '29 As Ernest Young recently observed, "judicial activism"
"involve[s] a refusal by the court deciding a particular case to defer to other
sorts of authority at the expense of its own independent judgment about the
correct legal outcome." 30 While these definitions suggest that there are a
variety of judicial practices that may amount to "judicial activism," my
primary focus is on the relationship between courts and legislatures, and in
particular, on the relationship between the Supreme Court and Congress.
While judicial activism is problematic because the Court intrudes on the
democratic process, proponents of rights of belonging often argue that
activism is necessary to protect minorities against that process. 31 Yet the
widely held view of courts as protectors of minorities is a relatively recent
phenomenon. With the exception of the Warren Court, throughout our
history, activist courts have been considerably more likely to rule against
rights of belonging, not to uphold them.32 Legislatures, not courts, have
historically provided the most protection for those rights.
27 See Ernest A. Young, Judicial Activism and Conservative Politics, 73 U. COLO. L.
REv. 1139, 1143 (2002).
28 Probably the most ironic use of the term was when members of Congress accused
the federal courts of judicial activism for failing to hear the appeal of Terri Schiavo's
parents from the state court decision to allow doctors to terminate life sustaining
measures. See Edward A. Hartnett, Congress Clears its Throat, 22 CONST. COMMENT.
553, 555 ("For some, the term 'judicial activism' is an empty epithet, meaning little more
than that the one who hurls the term disagrees with a particular decision or line of
decisions.").
29 BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 862 (8th ed. 2004). See also Young, supra note 27, at
1144.
30 Young, supra note 27, at 1145.
31 See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 1014.
32 See infra notes 47-64 and accompanying text.
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A. The Terms of the Debate
Put simply, legislatures are elected by the people and therefore
accountable to the people for their policy decisions. Federal judges are not
elected, and their lifetime job protection makes them less accountable to the
people. Recently, political scientists have suggested that this account is
overly simplistic because "[j]udicial review is established and maintained by
elected officials." 33 Nevertheless, whenever a judge overrules the decision of
a legislature, he or she potentially subjects herself to charges of judicial
activism. As Alexander Bickel, a long-time critic of the Warren Court,
described it, the "counter-majoritarian difficulty" potentially undermines the
legitimacy of federal courts when they second-guess legislatures.34
Moreover, when the Supreme Court overturns an act of Congress, a co-equal
branch, that action raises the additional concern about the proper balance of
powers between the federal judiciary and the legislature.
Because the federal government is one of limited powers, there are two
types of Supreme Court decisions striking down federal legislation-those
decisions finding the legislation beyond the inherent, or internal limits of
Congress, and those holding that the legislation violates some external
constitutional limit. In the first group, the Court holds that Congress lacked
the power to legislate to begin with, which amounts to a facial invalidation
of a statute.35 In the second group, the Court may find that although
Congress had the inherent power to legislate, a particular application of the
law violates another provision of the Constitution.36 While both types of
decisions are arguably examples of judicial activism, the first group is more
problematic. 37
Whenever the Court holds that a federal statute is beyond the inherent
powers of Congress, it is second-guessing Congress's determination that the
33 Graber, supra note 20, at 427.
34 See BICKEL, supra note 11, at 16-23; see also Young, supra note 27, at 1146. It is
debatable whether courts actually behave in a counter-majoritarian fashion. See generally
Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National
Policy-maker, 50 EMORY L.J. 563 (2001); Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular
Constitutionalism, 101 MICH. L. REv. 2596 (2003). Nonetheless, the fact remains that
political officials are elected by the people, and judges are not.
35 For example, the Court may find that a statute falls beyond Congress's Commerce
power. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 619 (2000).
36 For example, the Court may find that a criminal law violates the Fifth
Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136, 138 (1965).
37 Jesse Choper makes a similar argument, that judicial review of the political
branches is generally not justified unless it is on behalf of protecting individual rights.
See JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A
FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 59-60 (1980).
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statute was constitutional, and correspondingly expanding the power of the
Court at the expense of Congress.38 While both types of rulings involve the
exercise of judicial review, arguably only the first group entails an assertion
of judicial supremacy 39 because the Court is second-guessing the presumed
judgment of members of Congress that they had the constitutional power to
act. Courts are better suited for the second type of determination,
considering the constitutionality of a particular application of a statute, since
applying the law to a particular set of facts is what courts are best qualified
to do. While either type of ruling enables courts to indulge in policy
preferences and limit the means used by Congress, only the first type
completely disables Congress from pursuing the ends that members of that
body want to achieve. 40
The flipside of judicial activism is "judicial restraint." "Restrained"
judges defer to the expertise of the political branches. As Thomas Keck
observes, "if judicial restraint means anything in the context of the long
conservative critique of the Warren Court and its legacy, it must mean a
relative unwillingness to declare constitutional limitations on government." 41
Judges exercising judicial restraint will be hesitant to overturn decisions
made by the political branches because they are cognizant of their
institutional limitations, including their lack of accountability. 42 Restrained
judges recognize the institutional advantages of the political branches when
they create law, and respect their authority to do so. Judicial restraint is thus
"rooted in a majoritarian conception of American democracy. '43 Hence,
judges should use judicial restraint whenever possible. 44
38 See CHOPER, supra note 37, at 36; Hartnett, supra note 28, at 557 (pointing out
the "presumption that Acts of Congress are constitutional").
39 See Keith E. Whittington, Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation: Three
Objections and Responses, 80 N.C. L. REv. 773, 780 (2002) (distinguishing between
"judicial review" and "judicial supremacy").
40 Thanks to Michelle Adams and Mark Graber for helping me to clarify my point
here.
41 KECK, supra note 7, at 1.
42 See, e.g., City of Clebume v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 460 (1985)
(Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
43 KECK, supra note 7, at 21.
44 The standard response to my call for judicial restraint is that when the Court
strikes down a legislative act, it acts with the authority to enforce the people's will
embodied in the Constitution. See Young, supra note 27, at 1147 (citing JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 8-9 (1980)). However, this
argument is less persuasive when one considers that Congress is also interpreting the
Constitution when it legislates, especially when it legislates to protect fundamental rights
like rights of belonging. See ZIETLow, ENFORCING EQUALITY, supra note 9, at 9-10; see
generally KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONsTRUCTION: DIDED POWERS
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Of course, this discussion of judicial activism and restraint is arguably
beside the point to those who are most concerned about rights of minorities.
"Sure," they argue, "ideally both courts and Congress act to protect rights of
belonging,45 and proponents of those rights should only resort to courts
when they fail in the political process. But sometimes it is necessary for
judges to intervene in that process in order to insure that it works, and often
this intervention is needed on behalf of minorities." 46 However, while this
theory makes sense in the abstract, it is not borne out by our history.47
Minorities often lose in courts, and they tend to win in the political process
far more often than this standard paradigm suggests. Moreover, with the
exception of the Warren Court, activist courts have often refused to defer to
the legislative victories of minorities.
B. Judicial Activism 's Impact on Congress 's Enduring Role as a
Protector of Rights of Belonging
Ever since Reconstruction, members of Congress have acted repeatedly
to protect rights of belonging, playing a leading role in historical periods
marked by great expansions of rights of belonging, including
Reconstruction, the New Deal, and the Second Reconstruction of the
1960s.48 Congress's rights-generating role is mandated by the Constitution,
enshrined not only in the enforcement clauses of the Reconstruction
Amendments, but in every single subsequent constitutional amendment that
expands individual rights.49 However, the Supreme Court has often
AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (1999). see ZIETLOW, ENFORCING EQUALITY, supra note
9, at 9-10.
45 Indeed, effective protection of those rights probably requires all branches acting
in concert. See generally GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS
BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991).
46 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); ELY,
supra note 44, at 7-8.
47 See Klarman, supra note 11, at 7.
48 Of course, Congress has also often remained inactive in the face of societal
injustice. The most notable example of this inaction is Congress's failure to enact
legislation to address race discrimination in the Jim Crow Era from the end of
Reconstruction until the late 1950s. For a detailed discussion of this period, see MICHAEL
J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS (2004). For an in-depth discussion of
congressional action and inaction during this period, see ZIETLOW, ENFORCING EQUALITY,
supra note 9, at chs. 3-6 (discussing the historical dynamics of congressional protection
of rights of belonging during Reconstruction, the New Deal, and the Second
Reconstruction of the 1960s).
49 See U.S. CONST. amends. XIII (abolishing slavery and giving Congress the power
to "enforce this article by appropriate legislation"), XIV, XV (prohibiting the federal
government and states from denying the right to vote on account of race and giving
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responded negatively to congressional efforts to protect rights of belonging,
narrowly reading congressional power to protect those rights and restricting
the scope of such legislation. 50 Historically, what is at stake in the debate
over judicial activism is not just the proper relationship between courts and
legislatures, but the scope of our rights to belong to the national community.
1. Reconstruction
Members of the Reconstruction Congress enacted the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to end slavery and protect the rights
of freed slaves and other persons within their jurisdiction. All of these
Amendments contained enforcement provisions empowering Congress to
protect those rights. The enforcement clauses marked a major constitutional
change. Before those, there was no provision of the Constitution that
empowered Congress to protect rights of belonging, or any other individual
rights. 51 Indeed, empowering Congress to protect rights of belonging was
central to the mission of the Thirty-Ninth Congress and the raison d'etre of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 52 Members of the Reconstruction Congress
viewed the Supreme Court as an agent of the Slave Power. The pro-slavery
Congress the power to "enforce this article by appropriate legislation"), XIX (prohibiting
the denial of the right to vote on account of sex and giving Congress the power to
"enforce this article by appropriate legislation"), XXIII (bestowing the right to vote for
the President on residents of the District of Columbia and giving Congress the power to
"enforce this article by appropriate legislation"), XXIV (prohibiting the use of poll taxes
as a voting qualification and giving Congress the power to "enforce this article by
appropriate legislation"), XXVI (lowering the voting age to eighteen and giving Congress
the power to "enforce this article by appropriate legislation").
50 Indeed, it is the Warren Court's deference to congressional power to protect rights
of belonging, and not the Rehnquist Court's activism against that power, that is the
historical anomaly.
51 Notwithstanding this fact, the Supreme Court upheld two fugitive slave acts as
enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Clause and the property rights of slave owners. See
Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 622 (1842); Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21
How.) 506, 526 (1858).
52 As John Bingham, the principal author of that Amendment, explained during the
debate over the Amendment, "Sir, it has been the want of the Republic that there was not
an express grant of power in the Constitution to enable the whole people of every State,
by congressional enactment, to enforce obedience to these requirements of the
Constitution." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (1866). The Warren Court
recognized this, noting that "the sponsors and supporters of the [Fourteenth] Amendment
were primarily interested in augmenting the power of Congress, rather than the
judiciary." Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648 n.7 (1966) (citing JACOBUS
TENBROEK, THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 187-217
(1951) and Laurent B. Frantz, Congressional Power to Enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment Against Private Acts, 73 YALE L.J. 1353, 1356-57 (1964)).
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Dred Scott decision, not the anti-segregation Brown v. Board of Education,
was their model of the Court's treatment of individual rights. Therefore, they
saw themselves, and not the Court, as the primary enforcers of rights of
belonging.53
Along with the Reconstruction Amendments, these members of
Congress enacted numerous statutes protecting rights of belonging,
including civil rights statutes and the Freedmen's Bureaus with their massive
social programs to facilitate Reconstruction. 54 After the compromise of
1876, Democrats took control of Congress and the political body turned
away from protecting rights of belonging. However, well before that date,
the Court had already restricted the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment
in The Slaughter-House Cases.55 In 1883, the Court issued perhaps its most
important decision restricting the scope of the Reconstruction Amendments:
the Civil Rights Cases, limiting Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment to remedying state action and narrowly defining the "badges
and incidents of slavery" remediable by Congress's power to enforce the
Thirteenth Amendment. 56 These decisions proved that members of the
Reconstruction Congress had been right to distrust the Court.57
2. The New Deal Era
It was not until the 1960s and the advent of the modem civil rights
movement that Congress returned to protecting the rights of racial
minorities. In the meantime, before and during the New Deal, Congress
acted to protect the rights of belonging of workers and poor people. In the
53 See James W. Fox, Citizenship, Poverty and Federalism, 60 U. PrrT. L. REV. 421,
512 (1999); Post & Siegel, Equal Protection, supra note 8, at 507.
54 See ZiETLOW, ENFORCING EQUALITY, supra note 9, at ch. 3 (discussing the
historical dynamics of congressional protection of rights of belonging during
Reconstruction).
55 83 U.S. 36, 52 (1872).
56 109 U.S. 3, 24-25 (1883). As Pamela Brandwein details, in these cases the Court
adopted the view of the Democratic opponents of those measures in the Reconstruction
Congress. See PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RECONSTRUCTING RECONSTRUCTION: THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE PRODUCTION OF HISTORICAL TRUTH 88 (1999). The Warren Court
overturned the Court's narrow definition of the "badges and incidents of slavery" in
Jones v. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968). See infra notes 170-74 and accompanying
text.
57 The Reconstruction Congress did expand the jurisdiction of federal courts over
civil rights matters in statutes such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1334. These
statutes are best explained by the fact that these members of Congress distrusted state
courts even more than federal courts, and because they wanted to make every possible
avenue for the vindication of civil rights. See Xi Wang, The Making of Federal
Enforcement Laws, 1870-1872, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1013 (1995).
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years leading up to the New Deal, workers had repeatedly gained rights in
the legislative process only to have federal and state courts invalidate their
gains as violating the common law "right to contract," and enjoining their
right to strike as intruding on their employers' "property rights. ' 58 Rather
than turning to the courts to enforce their rights, during this era, as during
the Reconstruction Era, reformers viewed courts as an obstacle to achieving
social reforms. One of their principle legislative victories was the 1932
Norris-LaGuardia Act, which restricted federal jurisdiction over labor
relations in order to stifle the judicial activism those courts were using
against workers and their right to organize. 59
During the time of the New Deal, Congress enacted the Wagner Act,
creating a statutory right for workers to organize into a union and engage in
collective bargaining, protecting other workers' rights, including the right to
a minimum wage, and creating an economic safety net for workers. 60 When
enacting these measures, members of Congress championed a constitutional
vision that centered on individual freedom and the ideology of social
citizenship. 61 After its flurry of activity during the New Deal, Congress was
never as pro-labor again, enacting the pro-business Taft Hartley Act only
twelve years later. As during Reconstruction, however, the Court was
considerably more influential than Congress in restricting the scope of
workers' rights, upholding the Wagner Act but issuing numerous rulings
reducing the effectiveness of its protections. 62  Exercising popular
constitutionalism, New Deal politicians, not judges, brought about the
greatest expansion of rights of belonging since the Reconstruction Era,
despite the judicial activism restricting the scope of those rights.
58 Id. at 1030-33.
5 9 See ZIETLOW, ENFORCING EQUALrrY, supra note 9, at 71.
60 See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-166 (2000)); Fair Labor Standards Act, ch. 676, 52 Stat.
1060 (1938) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2000)); Social Security Act,
ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (1935). The Wagner Act established a worker's statutory right to
organize into unions and bargain collectively with employers. The Act brought about a
marked increase in union membership, providing workers with a source of economic
empowerment, a source of community, and political empowerment, and contributed to
the nascent civil rights movement. The Wagner Act had its weaknesses, most notably
excluding the predominantly African-American domestic and agricultural workers in
order to limit the opposition of Southern Democrats. See ZIETLOW, ENFORCING
EQUALITY, supra note 9, at 93-95.
61 See ZIETLOW, ENFORCING EQUALITY, supra note 9, at ch. 4 (discussing the
historical dynamics of congressional passage of the National Labor Relations Act);
William E. Forbath, Caste, Class and Equal Citizenship, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1, 4 (1999).
62 See James Gray Pope, How American Workers Lost the Right to Strike, and Other
Tales, 103 MICH. L. REV. 518, 524 (2004).
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As a result of the Court's history of restricting Congress's power to
protect rights of belonging, progressives in the first half of the twentieth
century saw judicial activism as anathema. New Deal Era progressives on
the Warren Court such as Justices Hugo Black and Felix Frankfurter became
the leading opponents of that Court's activism.63 While those opponents of
judicial activism would dissent in a number of "activist" Warren Court
cases, 64 they also influenced the Warren Court as it issued numerous rulings
exercising restraint and upholding congressional power to create new rights
of belonging during the Second Reconstruction of the 1960s. 65
III. THE JUDICIAL ACTIVISM OF THE WARREN COURT
To be sure, in numerous cases, the Warren Court played an activist role
by intervening in the political process. Perhaps the best known "activist"
Warren Court case is one of its first, Brown v. Board of Education, in which
the Court held that segregated elementary schools violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, overruling the precedent of
Plessy v. Ferguson66 and challenging the segregationist way of life of
millions of Americans. 67 In a series of decisions following Brown, the Court
struck down state-sponsored segregation in other state-run facilities,
contributing to the eventual dismantling of the Jim Crow system in the
South.68 Throughout the Warren Court Era, the Court often ruled in favor of
civil rights and civil liberties, interpreting those civil rights and liberties
expansively at the expense of legislatures,69 ordering the reconfiguration of
legislative districts, 70 incorporating the Bill of Rights against the states via
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 and expanding
63 See KECK, supra note 7, at 17-33.
64 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 507-28 (1965) (Black, J.
dissenting).
65 See infra Section IV.E.
66 163 U.S. 537, 550-52 (1896).
67 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495-96 (1954).
68 See, e.g., New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54
(1958) (parks); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (buses); Holmes v. Atlanta, 350
U.S. 879 (1955) (golf courses)Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955)
(beaches); see also KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CmIzENsHIP
AND THE CONSTITUTION 58-61, 80 (1989).
69 See, e.g., Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
70 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 586-87 (1964).
71 See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643, 656-60 (1961).
2008]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
federal jurisdiction to facilitate the vindication of those rights in federal
courts. 72 This activism subjected the Warren Court to virulent criticism from
academics and politicians alike. It also made the Warren Court a heroic icon
for an entire generation of lawyers and academics, and many of their
subsequent students. 73
A. The Warren Court's Activism
In the Warren Court's early years, its activism was largely limited to
expanding its mandate in Brown to other government facilities and
upholding the First Amendment rights of public employees accused of
supporting communism. 74 The Warren Court also expanded the reach of the
First Amendment on behalf of civil rights activists with its landmark ruling
in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.75 The Warren Court interpreted federal
rights expansively, especially those of criminal defendants, reinvigorated the
Equal Protection Clause, and identified new fundamental rights such as the
right to vote and the right to privacy.76 In another series of decisions, the
Warren Court interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment to incorporate virtually
the entire Bill of Rights against state governments. 77 All of these decisions
reflected the Warren Court's confidence that federal courts could
competently determine the scope of individual rights, even when doing so
arguably injected those courts into the realm of public policy.
Other Warren Court decisions seem at first glance to reflect a distrust of
the political process. The Warren Court also enhanced the power of the
federal courts through, among other things, articulating expansive tests for
72 See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288
(1964); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
73 Balkin & Levinson, supra note 7, at 1091.
74 See POWE, supra note 7, at 75-102. Due in large part to intense congressional
criticism, the Court's record of upholding First Amendment rights during this period was
decidedly mixed. Id. at 79.
75 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See KECK, supra note 7, at 71; Gerhardt, supra note 11, at
618.
76 See Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (right to vote);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 382 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to privacy); Brenda Swierenga, Still
Newer Equal Protection: Impermissible Purpose Review in the 1984 Term, 53 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1454, 1455-56 (1986) (discussing the Warren Court's Equal Protection cases).
77 See, e.g., Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (incorporating the Sixth
Amendment right to a speedy and public trial); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964)
(incorporating the Fifth Amendment right of freedom from self incrimination); Gideon v.
Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (incorporating the Sixth Amendment right to counsel);
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (incorporating the Fourth Amendment right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures).
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private rights of action, 78 narrowly reading the political question doctrine
and standing limitations,79 and engaging the federal courts in remedying the
segregation of public schools.80 In Reynolds v. Sims, the Court established
the "one person one vote" rule, putting into question the legitimacy of ninety
percent of congressional districts and virtually all seats in state legislatures. 81
Because of their impact on the political process, the reapportionment
cases-Sims and its progeny-are arguably the most activist cases of the
Warren Court.82 The reapportionment decisions reflect a distrust of the
electoral process, especially that process in southern states,83 and lend
support to the view that "the [Warren Court] justices simply did not share
the scholars' faith in the democratic character of ordinary politics." 84
The Warren Court's activist decisions have been cause for both
vilification and celebration. However, both opponents and supporters of the
Warren Court tend to leave out that Court's legacy of restraint and respect
for the legislative process, especially when that process was used as a means
of popular constitutionalism.
B. Criticism of the Warren Court's Activism
From the outset, the Warren Court had its critics in both academia and
the political process. Many of the Court's critics argued that the Court had
exceeded its proper role within the system of separation of powers. For
example, in 1958, the well-respected Judge Learned Hand gave a series of
lectures at Harvard Law School in which he accused the Court of acting as if
they were "Platonic Guardians. '85 Similarly, Professor Herbert Wechsler
78 See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
79 See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) (political question doctrine did
not bar Court from ruling on disputes between members of Congress); Flast v. Cohen,
392 U.S. 83 (1968) (prudential doctrine against taxpayer standing did not bar plaintiff
from challenging congressional expenditure of money on the grounds that it violated the
Establishment Clause); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (political question doctrine
did not bar Court from considering an Equal Protection challenge to state election
districts).
80 See, e.g., Green v. City Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Griffin v. City Sch. Bd.,
377 U.S. 218 (1964).
81 98 U.S. 145 (1964). See POWE, supra note 7, at 252.
82 See POwE, supra note 7, at 242-52. As Lucas Powe points out, however,
Congress acted first to reform the electoral system, proposing two constitutional
amendments, to abolish the poll tax in federal elections and to allow DC residents to vote
for president. Id. at 239.
83 Id. at 489.
84 KECK, supra note 7, at 64.
85 HAND, supra note 11, at 73-74 (1958); KECK, supra note 7, at 56-57.
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criticized the Court's reasoning in Brown because he felt it could not be
justified by "neutral principles." 86 In numerous works, Professor Alexander
Bickel criticized the Court for making not law, but public policy. 87 Probably
the most virulent critic of the Court in academia was Professor Philip
Kurland, who accused the Warren Court of being dogmatic, results-oriented,
and even disingenuous. 88
Criticism of the Warren Court also was common in the political realm.
In 1956, southern members of Congress adopted the "Southern Manifesto,"
which charged that the Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education was
"a clear abuse of judicial power [that] climaxes a trend in the Federal
judiciary undertaking to legislate, in derogation of the authority of Congress,
and [encroaches] upon the reserved rights of the States and the people." 89
Richard Nixon made his opposition to the Warren Court a central feature of
his successful run for president in 1968.90
In Congress, critics of the Court accused it of being pro-communist,
undermining the states, and of being incompetent. Jurisdiction-stripping
measures were proposed several times in response to the Court's decision
upholding the First Amendment rights of those accused of supporting
communism and imposing re-districting on the states.91 The Court's rulings
striking down prayer in schools inspired some members of Congress to call
for impeachment. 92 Indeed, "Impeach Earl Warren" signs were ubiquitous
throughout the South during Warren's tenure. 93
None of the jurisdiction-stripping measures succeeded. Instead,
Congress expanded federal jurisdiction in statutes such as the 1964 Civil
Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act, indicating support for the
Court's efforts. Nonetheless, political charges of judicial activism permeated
the entire Warren Court Era. 94
86 Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REv. 1, 24 (1959).
8 7 ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGREss 175
(1978).
88 Kurland, supra note 11, at 145.
89 102 CONG. REC. H4515-16 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 1956) (statement of Rep. Smith).
90 See POwE, supra note 7, at 408-10.
91 Id. at 87, 99, 130-33, 252-53.
92 See Michael Belknap, God and the Warren Court: The Quest for "A Wholesome
Neutrality," 9 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 401,401 (1999).
93 See POWE, supra note 7, at 141.
94 Id. at 93.
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C. Praise of the Warren Court's Activism
Critics of the Warren Court are not the only ones who view the Court as
a paradigm of the activist Court. Many supporters of the Court extol
precisely its activism, exhibiting what Laura Kalman calls a "religious and
mystical" view of the Warren Court.95 For example, one of the Court's most
ardent supporters, Owen Fiss, claims that although the Court drew on social
movements and responded to historical circumstances, "the truth of the
matter is that it was the Warren Court that spurred the great changes to
follow, and inspired and protected those who sought to implement them."96
To Fiss and other supporters of the Warren Court, the Court was heroically
anti-majoritarian, championing the rights of minorities in opposition to the
political bodies.97 Other scholars have argued that this view of the Warren
Court is anti-historical because the Warren Court's rulings largely tracked
the politics of the era.98 Yet the view of the Warren Court as the
"quintessentially 'activist"' 99 Court persists both inside and outside the
academic arena.
The widespread view of the Warren Court as an activist champion of
minority rights against majoritarian tyranny is understandable given the fact
that most constitutional scholars either grew up during the Warren Court
Era, or were taught by constitutional law professors who grew up during that
Era. To those scholars, "the philosophy of judicial restraint [championed by
New Deal progressives] now seemed to justify the Court's decades-long
collaboration with Jim Crow" prior to the Court's decision in Brown.100
Though the New Dealers had championed judicial restraint to end the
95 LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 4 (1996).
96 Fiss, supra note 11, at 1118.
97 See, e.g., Micahel J. Gerhardt, The Rhetoric of Judicial Critique: From Judicial
Restraint to the Virtual Bill of Rights, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 585, 618 (2002)
(pointing out the political protest that followed the Court's rulings in favor of African-
Americans); Bernard Schwartz, Capturing the Future: Earl Warren and Supreme Court
History: The Warren Court: A Retrospective, 32 TULSA L.J. 843, 875 (1997) (finding that
the "constitutional law promulgated by the Warren Court was and has been, especially for
Afican-Americans, the civil rights movement, and criminal defendants, an unalloyed
good"); see also Klarman, supra note 11, at 19 (citing scholars who argue Brown proves
that courts are "countermajoritarian heroics" who protect minority rights by questioning
that view).
98 See, e.g., POWE, supra note 7, at xv ("I hope to eschew the law professor's
traditional Court-centered focus and instead place the Court where it belongs as one of
the three co-equal branches of government, influencing and influenced by American
politics and its cultural and intellectual currents."); Klarman, supra note 11, at 19.
99 Luban, supra note 11, at 8.
100 Balkin & Levinson, supra note 7, at 1091.
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Lochner Era, by 1964, "judicial restraint" was no longer the call of
progressives, but that of conservatives "satisfied to continue collaborating
with manifest injustice."' 10 1 However, championing the Justices on the
Warren Court as anti-majoritarian activists unduly discounts what is perhaps
the most important legacy of the Warren Court-not its activism, but its
restraint.
IV. THE JUDICIAL RESTRAINT OF THE WARREN COURT
Notwithstanding the Warren Court's scrutiny of the electoral process in
its re-apportionment cases, when it came to evaluating the actions of elected
representatives, the Warren Court exhibited a markedly deferential view
towards politics. The Court applied a baseline of rational basis review to all
legislative acts, both state and federal, including those protecting rights of
belonging. The Warren Court's opinions evaluating economic legislation and
the powers of Congress are familiar to any first-year constitutional law
student. Nevertheless, their import seems lost on the vast majority of
observers who characterize the Warren Court as rejecting political
pluralism. 10 2 To the contrary, those decisions illustrate the fact that, in
general, the Warren Court assumed that the process of legislative
deliberation worked.
During a period of fifteen years, the Warren Court struck down only
twenty-three federal statutes, 10 3 and in none of those cases did the Court find
that a statute exceeded the inherent power of Congress. 10 4 Instead, the Court
struck down federal statutes for the same reason it struck down state
statutes-because they violated individual rights. 10 5 Throughout its fifteen-
101 Id. at 1091; see also id. at 1088-91. By contrast, scholars such as Philip Kurland
and Justice Felix Frankfurter, who matured during the Lochner era, retained their distrust
ofjudicial activism. Id. at 1090-91; KECK, supra note 7, at 25.
102 But see Balkin & Levinson, supra note 7, at 1092 ("The Warren Court liberals
accepted the New Dealers' view that ... Congress could do basically whatever it wished
in regulating the economy."); Post & Siegel, Equal Protection, supra note 8, at 495
(emphasizing Warren Court approval of Congress's constitutional authority to enact anti-
discrimination legislation).
103 KECK, supra note 7, at 40. By contrast, from 1995 to 2003, the Rehnquist Court
struck down 33 federal statutes. Id.
104 The only case that arguably limited the inherent power of Congress was Reid v.
Covert, in which the Court held that Congress could not use its treaty power to violate
individual constitutional rights. 354 U.S. 1, 19-23 (1957). However, Reid is better
understood as simply imposing external limitations on the treaty power, and is thus
consistent with the other Warren Court cases that invalidated federal statutes solely on
the grounds that they violated individual rights. See Appendix A.
105 See Appendix A. The Warren Court's cases invalidating state statutes are less
constitutionally problematic for a number of reasons. First, the Court is not second-
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year term, the Warren Court gave Congress broad autonomy to legislate.
Many Warren Court decisions reflect that Court's respect for the legislative
process, especially when Congress used that process to protect rights of
belonging. The decisions allowed supporters of rights of belonging and their
representatives in Congress to engage in popular constitutionalism on behalf
of those rights.
A. Baseline-Rational Basis Review
In the economic realm, members of the Warren Court followed in the
footsteps of their late New Deal predecessors, who had repudiated the
Lochner Era of active judicial intervention that characterized the first third
of the Twentieth Century. During the Lochner Era, courts had viewed
economic regulation as inherently suspect and carefully scrutinized both the
legislative means and ends. 106 After President Roosevelt attacked this
interventionist approach, the Supreme Court changed its mind and relaxed
its scrutiny. 10 7 n cases such as United States v. Carolene Products, the late
New Deal Court indicated that economic legislation would enjoy a new
presumption of legitimacy whether or not members of the Court approved of
it. 108 While most of these cases involved state legislation, the rational basis
baseline also provided ample room for Congress to act.
In Carolene Products, the late New Deal Court applied rational basis
review to a federal law barring the sale of "filled" milk 109 and deferred to
congressional fact-finding supporting the statute.110 In his famous footnote
four, Justice Stone suggested that the Court would apply a higher level of
scrutiny to legislation that infringed on fundamental rights, restricted the
guessing the acts of a coordinate branch. See supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text.
Second, the Court's invalidation of state statutes is constitutionally mandated by both the
Supremacy Clause and Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court's early
history reflects its understanding of this point. The Court only invalidated two federal
statutes between the years of 1790 and 1865, but invalidated many state statutes. See
Robert Lowry Clinton, MARBURY V. MADISON AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 20-30 (1989). After
1865, the Fourteenth Amendment amplified the power of the federal government vis-4-
vis the states, including the power of the federal courts to review the acts of state
legislatures to ensure that they do not violate individual rights. Thanks to Leslie
Goldstein for making this point to me.
1 0 6 WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR
MOVERMENT 39-40, 43-44 (1991).
107 ZIETLOW, ENFORCING EQUALITY, supra note 9, at 90-91.
108 See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
109 Id. at 152.
110 Id. ("[T]he existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be
presumed .... ).
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political process, or affected "discrete and insular minorities."' I  Scholars
have argued persuasively that the Warren Court's approach to judicial
review was guided by footnote four's focus on improving the political
process and protecting racial minorities. 112 While some have questioned
whether footnote four of Carolene Products actually influenced the Warren
Court,1 13 the body of the opinion clearly provided a blueprint for that Court.
In its opinions evaluating economic legislation, the Warren Court
consistently applied a hands-off approach that reflected an underlying
respect for the legislative process.
An early Warren Court case, Williamson v. Lee Optical, 14 illustrates
this point. In that case, the Court upheld the constitutionality of an
Oklahoma statute that made it unlawful for a person not a licensed
optometrist or opthamologist to fit lenses to a face or duplicate or replace
lenses into frames except upon a written prescription. 115 In an opinion
written by Justice William 0. Douglas, the Court agreed that the provision
"may exact a needless, wasteful requirement in many cases." 116 However,
Douglas continued, "it is for the legislature, not the courts, to balance the
advantages and disadvantages of the new requirement." 117 The Court
concluded, "[f]or protection against abuses by legislatures the people must
resort to the polls, not to the courts." 118 The Warren Court thus reaffirmed
the deferential baseline for evaluating legislation from Carolene Products.
Absent evidence of invidious discrimination, the Court would assume that
the political process worked. 119
In Ferguson v. Skrupa, The Warren Court appeared to be even more
deferential to legislatures, rejecting a challenge to a Kansas statute that made
it a misdemeanor for any person to engage "' in the business of debt
I Id. at 153 n.4.
112 The most prominent example is ELY, supra note 44. See also POWE, supra note
7, at 487 (describing this view as the "conventional view.").
113 See POWE, supra note 7, at 489 (challenging the view that the Warren Court was
guided by Carolene Products and pointing out that the Warren Court rulings helped the
same people who were benefiting from the political process at the time).
114 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
115 Id. at 485. The statute exempted sellers of ready-to-wear glasses, prohibited
radio and television advertisement of eyeglasses, prohibited soliciting the sale of framers
or mountings, and prohibited firms and corporations engaged in real estate from renting
space to persons conducting eye examinations. Id. at 485-89. The Court also rejected
challenges to those provisions. Id.
116 Id. at 487.
117 Id
118 Id. at 488 (citing Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1876)).
119 See id. at 489 ("The prohibition of the Equal Protection Clause goes no further
than the invidious discrimination. We cannot say that that point has been reached here.").
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adjusting' except as an incident to 'the lawful practice of law in the
state."' 120 Skrupa, a debt adjuster who was not a lawyer, argued that the
state could not prohibit him from practicing his profession because it was
neither inherently immoral, nor dangerous, nor in any way contrary to the
public welfare. 121 The Court declined to comment on the merits of this
argument, explaining:
Under the system of government created by our Constitution, it is up
to legislatures, not courts, to decide on the wisdom and utility of
legislation ....
... Unquestionably, there are arguments showing that the business of
debt adjusting has social utility, but such arguments are properly addressed
to the legislature, not to us. 12 2
Once again, absent evidence of invidious discrimination, the Court
deferred to the fact-finding capability of the legislature and assumed that the
political process worked.
B. Commerce Clause
The legacy of the late New Deal Court is also reflected in the Warren
Court's approach to the Commerce Clause, the principal source of
congressional regulatory power. Just as it had in the area of substantive due
process, the Court had applied heightened scrutiny to strike down early New
Deal Commerce Clause-based measures such as the National Industrial
Recovery Act. 123 Indeed, it was President Roosevelt's frustration with those
decisions that led him to attack the Court and recommend his Court-packing
plan.' 24 Shortly thereafter, the Court adopted a deferential approach to
uphold important measures such as the National Labor Relations Act, 125 the
Fair Labor Standards Act,126 and the Agricultural Adjustment Act. 127 The
120 Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 726-27 (1963).
121 Id. at 727.
122 Id. at 729, 731.
123 See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 550 (1935).
124 See KEVIN J. MCMAHON, RECONSIDERING ROOSEVELT ON RACE: How THE
PRESIDENCY PAVED THE ROAD TO BROWN 48 (2003).
125 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 46-47 (1937).
126 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 125 (1941).
127 Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942). See KECK, supra note 7, at 24
("The Court abandoned its enforcement of long-standing constitutional limits on
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Warren Court relied on those precedents to uphold the 1964 Civil Rights Act
in a decision which deferred to Congress's authority to address private
discrimination. Thus, since 1964, Commerce Clause-based legislation has
played a crucial role in shaping our nation's civil rights agenda. 128
, The 1964 Civil Rights Act was a landmark measure that outlawed race
discrimination in places of public accommodation, employment, and
education.' 29 The measure was based in Congress's power to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause. In Heart of Atlanta
Motel v. United States, the Court upheld Title II of the Act, the public
accommodations provision, based on Congress's power to regulate interstate
commerce.1 30 Justice Clark applied a relaxed form of rational basis review
to the Commerce Clause, calling the commerce power "a specific and
plenary one" 131 that Congress could use as long as "the activity sought to be
regulated is 'commerce which concerns more states than one.' 132 Noting
the "voluminous testimony" about the impact of race discrimination on the
travel and other economic activity of African Americans, 133 the Court held
that the Act was a valid use of the commerce power even though it was
aimed primarily at "moral wrongs."'134 Thus, the Court deferred to
Congress's choice of means as well as its choice of ends. 135
In the companion case, Katzenbach v. McClung, the Court upheld the
application of the Act to a restaurant located in Birmingham, Alabama. 136
Although the restaurant's connection to interstate commerce was
considerably more attenuated than that of the motel, the Court found that the
legislative power, limits rooted in fundamental principles of limited govemment and
private property rights. In place of these limits, many New Deal constitutionalists offered
the Holmesian doctrine of majoritarian democracy and judicial self-restraint."); PowE,
supra note 7, at 4.
128 See Post & Siegel, Equal Protection, supra note 8, at 443.
129 The 1964 Act was extremely popular, with over seventy percent of Americans
supporting it at the time of its passage, and its supporter, President Lyndon Johnson, was
re-elected by a landslide shortly before the Court issued its opinions upholding the Act.
See POWE, supra note 7, at 238.
130 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964).
131 Id. at 258.
132 Id. at 255 (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, (1824)).
133 Id. at 253.
134 Id. at 257. While agreeing that the Act was a valid use of the commerce power,
in concurrence, Justices Douglas and Goldberg argued that it also could be upheld as an
exercise of Congress's Section Five power. Id. at 280 (Douglas, J., concurring), 293
(Goldberg, J., concurring).
135 The Court also rejected the motel's argument that the statute deprived it of
liberty or property under the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 258-62.
136 379 U.S. 294, 305 (1964).
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restaurant's purchases of food that had moved in interstate commerce, and
the aggregate effect of African-Americans reducing their spending due to
racial discrimination like that practiced by the restaurant was a sufficient
nexus to interstate commerce to rationally justify Congress's power to
regulate.137 The Court noted, "where we find that the legislators, in light of
the facts and testimony before them, have a rational basis for finding a
chosen regulatory scheme necessary to the protection of commerce, our
investigation is at an end."' 138 Characterizing Congress's commerce power as
"broad and sweeping," the Court all but abdicated its role in scrutinizing the
commerce power. "[W]here [Congress] keeps within its sphere and violates
no express constitutional limitation it has been the rule of this Court, going
back almost to the founding days of the Republic, not to interfere." 139
C. Section Five
Given the Warren Court's positive disposition towards rights of
belonging and the civil rights movement, perhaps it is not surprising that the
Court displayed the most deference toward Congress when evaluating civil
rights measures enacted pursuant to the enforcement provisions of the
Reconstruction Amendments. Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment
grants Congress the power to enforce its provisions by "appropriate
legislation."'140 Recognizing that members of the Reconstruction Congress
saw themselves, and not the Court, as the primary enforcers of rights of
belonging, the Warren Court interpreted these enforcement powers
broadly. 141 As in its other opinions evaluating congressional power, the
Court applied rational basis to Section Five-based legislation. 142 Moreover,
passages of its opinions on Section Five power indicate deference not only
137 Id. at 298-99.
138 Id. at 303-04.
139 Id. at 305. Five years later, in one of the last Warren Court opinions, a divided
Court went even further and upheld application of the Act to a recreation club located in
the mountains near Little Rock, Arkansas, accessible only by country roads. See Daniel v.
Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969).
140 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. The Fifteenth Amendment, which prohibits the
denial of the franchise on account of race, contains a virtually identical enforcement
clause, U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2, and the Court treats the two clauses
interchangeably.
141 See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648 n.7 (1966); South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326 (1966).
142 Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution From the People:
Juricentric Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1, 36 [hereinafter Protecting]
("Katzenbach applied to Section 5 power the same standards of deference that the post-
New Deal Court has applied to every other grant of congressional authority.").
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to congressional remedial power, but arguably also to congressional
autonomy to interpret the substance of the Constitution. 143
In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the Court upheld the constitutionality
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.144 Like the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the
1965 Voting Rights Act was a response to massive civil rights
demonstrations protesting the denial of the franchise in the South, and was
intended to enable the belonging of racial minorities to the national polity. 145
The main focus of the Act was to outlaw literacy tests, which had been used
in a racially discriminatory manner throughout the South. The Act created a
complex scheme of remedies aimed at districts where voting discrimination
was most likely to have occurred. For example, it prohibited the use of
literacy tests in districts where the Attorney General determines that fewer
than fifty percent of its residents are registered to vote, and authorized the
appointment of federal electoral examiners in those districts. 146 The blanket
prohibition of literacy tests was arguably inconsistent with the Court's
earlier ruling in Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections, that
literacy tests are not per se unconstitutional, because the statute did not
require a finding of intentional discrimination before the tests would be
outlawed. 147 South Carolina argued that to allow Congress to enact such a
bill would rob the courts of their rightful constitutional role, but the Court
disagreed.
In the majority opinion, Chief Justice Earl Warren noted that the
Framers had intended Congress to be "chiefly responsible for implementing
the rights created in § 1.' ' 148 Thus, he concluded, "in addition to the courts,
Congress has full remedial powers to effectuate the constitutional
prohibition against racial discrimination in voting. ' 149 The only question
was whether the legislation was a rational means to effectuate this
constitutional prohibition. 150 Warren cited McCulloch v. Maryland to
explain the Court's use of rational basis, noting that McCulloch's broad
143Id. at 34 ("Evidently the Warren Court saw nothing contradictory in
simultaneously upholding the rule of law and deferring to Congress's Section 5
authority.").
144 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
145 President Johnson introduced the Voting Rights Act only a week after the
violence of the voting rights march in Selma, Alabama was televised nationally, and a
Gallup Poll showed that fifty percent of Americans felt that the most important issue in
the country was civil rights. PowE, supra note 7, at 257.
146 Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 4(b), 79 Stat. 437 (codified at
42 U.S.C. §§ 1973a-p (2000)).
147 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
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vision of congressional power was "the basic test ... in all cases concerning
the express powers of Congress with relation to the reserved powers of the
states." 151 Applying rational basis, the Court had no trouble upholding § 4(b)
of the 1965 Voting Rights Act. Even in Lassiter, the Court had deemed that
literacy tests used with a discriminatory purpose would violate the Fifteenth
Amendment. 152 Hence, the Court deferred to Congress's findings that
literacy tests had in all likelihood been used with a discriminatory purpose in
the states most affected by the statute. 153 This was a relatively easy case.
1 54
Katzenbach v. Morgan was a considerably more difficult case.155 In
Morgan, the Court evaluated the constitutionality of § 4(e) of the Voting
Rights Act, which provided that no person who has successfully completed
the sixth grade in a public school accredited by the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico in which the language of instruction was other than English
could be denied the right to vote on account of his or her failure to read
English.156 No court had ever held that New York State officials had used
the literacy tests to discriminate on the basis of race, yet Congress relied on
its Section Five power to enact this provision. Hence, the case raised the
issue that the Court had skirted in the South Carolina case-to what extent
did Congress have the autonomous authority to identify constitutional
violations?
In his majority opinion, Justice William Brennan answered this question.
He allowed Congress a great deal of autonomy to identify constitutional
violations because "[a] construction of § 5 that would require a judicial
determination that the enforcement of the state law precluded by Congress
violated the Amendment, as a condition of sustaining the congressional
enactment, would depreciate both congressional resourcefulness and
congressional responsibility for implementing the amendment." 157 Noting
151 Id. at 326 ("Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end,
which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are
constitutional.") (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,421 (1819)).
152 Id. at 333-34 (citing Lassiter, 360 U.S. at 53).
1531Id.
154 Only Justice Black filed a partial dissent, objecting to the part of the opinion
upholding the provisions of the Act that required certain states to ask for pre-clearance
from the Attorney General before they could use qualifying devices like literacy tests. See
id. at 355-62 (Black, J., concurring and dissenting).
155 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
156 Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e) (2003). The provision was
sponsored by New York Senators Jacob Javits and Robert Kennedy, and it was intended
to supercede a New York state law which required the ability to read and write in English
as a condition of voting. Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 645 n.3.
157 Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 648.
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that Section Five was intended to give Congress "the same broad powers
expressed in the Necessary and Proper Clause," the Court again cited
McCulloch.158 The Court held that "Section 4(e) may be readily seen as
'plainly adapted' to enforcing the Equal Protection Clause both as a
measure to secure non-discriminatory treatment by the government and as a
measure to enhance the political power of the Puerto Rican community to
obtain better government services.] 59
The Court deferred to the fact-finding capabilities of Congress in
weighing the extent of the Puerto Rican community's need for the measure.
"It is not for us to review the congressional resolution of these factors. It is
enough that we be able to perceive a basis upon which the Congress might
resolve the conflict as it did."' 160 The Court also deferred to Congress's
assessment of the relationship between literacy in English and the ability to
cast an informed vote. Citing Congress's "specially informed legislative
competence," Brennan noted that "it was Congress's prerogative to weigh
these competing considerations" and overrule the state's determination that
literacy in English was necessary. 161 Here, the Court applied the same
deferential rational basis review to Section Five as it had to the commerce
power in Heart of Atlanta Motel. The Court's approach in Morgan was even
farther reaching, because the Court appeared to defer to congressional
judgment about the meaning of the Constitution.162
The Morgan case was a landmark decision, and arguably an invitation
for Congress to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment as broadly, and
protectively, as members of Congress saw fit, regardless of the Court's
interpretation of Section One. Former Solicitor General Archibold Cox
certainly understood the decisions in that way. Writing in early 1966, Cox
declared, "If the Congress follows the lead that the Court has provided, the
last Term's opinions interpreting section 5 will prove as important in
bespeaking national legislative authority to promote human rights as the
Labor Board decisions of 1937 were in providing national authority to
regulate the economy."' 163 Citing contemporary political theory that
158 Id. at 650-51.
159 Id. at 652-53.
160 Id. at 653.
161 Id. at 656.
162 Justice Brennan left unanswered the extent to which the Court was ceding the
authority to define constitutional rights to Congress, or simply the authority to anticipate
violations of constitutional rights as identified by the Court. See Protecting, supra note
142, at 35 n.153. Under the deferential watch of the Warren Court, however, the
distinction was trivial. I owe this thought to Mark Graber.
163 Archibold Cox, The Supreme Court 1965 Term Foreword: Constitutional
Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REv. 91, 91 (1966)
(footnote omitted).
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recognized the existence of positive rights, such as the right to jobs, medical
care, social security and housing, Cox noted, "once government is held to
have affirmative obligations to promote human rights much of the
responsibility must shift to the legislative and executive branches." 164 He
believed that the Morgan decision would allow Congress to do just that.
Most importantly, opined Cox, Congress might be able to use its Section
Five power to remedy private discrimination, notwithstanding the Court's
doctrine restricting the scope of Section One to state action. 165
Six members of the Court said as much that same year in their
concurrences to the Court's opinion in United States v. Guest.166 In Guest,
several private individuals were indicted for depriving African Americans of
the use of state-supported services, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 241, a civil
rights statute that dated back to the 1866 Civil Rights Act.167 A plurality of
the Court held that § 241 only applied to state action but that the facts
supported a finding of state action. 168 n two concurrences, six of the
Justices agreed that Congress could use Section Five to address private
action even though the scope of Section One was limited to state action.169
Speaking for a concurrence of three Justices that held that § 241 did
reach private discrimination but as such was constitutional, Justice Brennan
rejected the argument that Congress's Section Five power was limited by the
Court's earlier holding that Section One only applied to state action,170
protesting that such a view "reduces the legislative power to enforce the
provisions of the Amendment to that of the judiciary."' 71 He explained,
"Viewed in its proper perspective, § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment appears
as a positive grant of legislative power, authorizing Congress to exercise its
discretion in fashioning remedies to achieve civil and political equality for
all citizens." 17 2 n a short concurrence with little explanation, Justices Clark,
Black, and Fortas agreed with the plurality that § 241 did not address state
action, but added without explanation, "there now can be no doubt that the
specific language of § 5 empowers the Congress to enact laws punishing all
conspiracies-with or without state action-that interfere with Fourteenth
164 Id. at 94.
165 Cox argued that Congress could use its Section Five power to address private
discrimination "where that is a means of implementing the prohibition against the state."
Id. at 102.
166 383 U.S. 745 (1966). See Cox, supra note 163, at 108.
167 Guest, 383 U.S. at 747.
168 Id. at 754.
169 Id. at 783 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 762 (Clark, J., concurring).
170 See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 13 (1883).
171 Guest, 383 U.S. at 783. (Brennan, J., concurring).
172 Id. at 784 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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Amendment rights."' 73 These opinions supported Cox's argument that
Congress could use Section Five to do away with the state action
requirement regardless of how the Court interpreted Section One, suggesting
that Congress had wide autonomy to address private discrimination. 174
D. Thirteenth Amendment
The Warren Court also took a deferential approach to congressional
power to enforce another Reconstruction Amendment, the Thirteenth
Amendment, which prohibits slavery and involuntary servitude. Section Two
of that Amendment is virtually identical to the enforcement provisions of the
other Reconstruction Amendments. 175 Unlike the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments, however, on its face the Thirteenth Amendment clearly
applies to private action. 176 In the case of Jones v. Mayer, plaintiffs alleged
that defendant had refused to sell them a home because they were African
Americans, in violation of a provision of the 1866 Civil Rights Act that
prohibited race discrimination in the sale of real estate. 177 In the majority
opinion, Justice Potter Stewart held that the Thirteenth Amendment
enforcement power authorized Congress to legislate to abolish "all badges
and incidents of slavery," and applied rational basis review to the use of that
power.178
The Court held that Congress's determination that race discrimination in
real estate transactions was a badge or incident of slavery was a rational one.
Many of the Black Codes had limited the rights of blacks to buy property.
"And when racial discrimination herds men into ghettos and makes their
ability to buy property turn on the color of their skin, then it too is a relic of
slavery."' 179 The Court's decision in Jones has enormous symbolic
173 Id. at 762 (Clark, J., concurring). The plurality opinion held that § 241 required
state action, but that the state action requirement was satisfied.
174 See Cox, supra note 163, at 115. See also Post & Siegel, Equal Protection, supra
note 8, at 501 (arguing that in Guest, "[t]hrough a combination of interpretive strategems,
the Court decisively freed federal antidiscrimination legislation from the state action
requirement it preserved for its own Section 1 cases").
175 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2 ("Congress shall have power to enforce this
article by appropriate legislation.").
176 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § I ("Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude...
shall exist within the United States .... ).
177 Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 412-13 (1968); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 1982 (2000).
178 Jones, 392 U.S. at 439-40 ("Surely Congress has the power under the Thirteenth
Amendment rationally to determine what are the badges and the incidents of slavery, and
the authority to translate that determination into effective legislation.").
179 Id. at 442-43.
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significance. 180 Its ruling gave § 1982 the broadest possible interpretation
and in effect overturned the limited interpretation of Thirteenth Amendment
enforcement power in the Civil Rights Cases. 81 Moreover, by reinvigorating
this Reconstruction Era statute, the Court summoned the spirit of the
Reconstruction Congress, yet rejected the activist intrusion of the Court of
that era. Once again, the Warren Court deferred to Congress and
championed Congress's role as a protector of rights of belonging.
E. Congress in the Second Reconstruction
The Warren Court's restraint towards congressional power to protect
rights of belonging reinforced ongoing congressional activism to protect
those rights. After the Court upheld the 1964 Civil Rights Act, "a political
logic took hold in which the elected branches of government perceived
distinct rewards for approving civil rights legislation."' 82 The judicial
restraint of the Warren Court enabled Congress to play a leading role in this
transformation by protecting rights of belonging in our society. Starting in
the New Deal, federal statutes had been essential for the establishment of
workers' rights and an economic safety net. 183 Beginning in 1964, statutes
also became central to the nation's civil rights agenda.184
The 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act were just the
beginning of a period of congressional activism in protecting rights of
belonging. By the mid-1970s, Congress had adopted the most far-reaching
measures to protect those rights in our history. Other federal legislation
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race includes the Fair Housing
Act, which prohibits race discrimination in real estate transactions, 185 and
180 As Robert Post and Reva Siegel have observed, the Court's broad interpretation
of the Thirteenth Amendment enforcement clause in Jones "essentially ceded to Congress
sufficient constitutional authority to regulate the full range of discriminatory conduct by
private actors it sought to reach." Post & Siegel, Equal Protection, supra note 8, at 496.
181 See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 22-23 (1883).
182 Stephen M. Griffin, Judicial Supremacy and Equal Protection in a Democracy of
Rights, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 281, 291 (2002).
183 See ZrETLOW, ENFORCING EQUALITY, supra note 9, at 72-75.
184 Id. at ch. 5. See also William N. Eskridge, Reneging on History? Playing the
Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 79 CAL. L. REV. 613, 615 (1991).
185 Fair Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 90-284, Title VIII, § 817, 82 Stat. 89 (1968)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (2000)) (providing federal grants to state or local
governments for the purpose of preventing or eliminating discriminatory housing
practices).
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the Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974.186 Congress enacted legislation
prohibiting gender discrimination well before the Court recognized gender
as a protected class, 187 including the Equal Pay Act of 1963, Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, and
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978.188 During this period, Congress
also expanded the classifications of people whose rights were entitled to
protection beyond those classifications recognized by the Court, prohibiting
discrimination against the disabled 189 and the elderly' 90 and mandating
access to public education for disabled children. 191 Finally, Congress
expanded the economic safety net that it had established during the New
186 Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-495, Title V, 88 Stat.
1521 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691a-1691f (2000)) (prohibiting discrimination on the
basis of race, religion, sex, and age in lending).
187 See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Post & Siegel, supra note 3,
at 1995 n. 158 (2003); Reva B. Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender and the Constitution From
a Social Movement Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 297 (2001).
188 Education Amendments of 1972, Tit. IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000) (prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of sex in programs or activities receiving federal financial
assistance). See also The Women in Apprenticeship and Non-Traditional Occupations
Act, Pub. L. No. 102-530, 106 Stat. 3465 (1992) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2501-2509
(2000)) (providing grants to community-based organizations that deliver technical
assistance to the preparation of employers to recruit, train, and employ women).
189 The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-96 (2003) (prohibiting
discrimination against the disabled by recipients of federal funds); The Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 330 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12101-12213 (2000)) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of disability by state
and private employers and requiring state facilities to be accessible to the disabled). But
cf City of Clebume v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (rejecting plaintiffs'
claim that the disabled were entitled to heightened protection).
190 The Age Discrimination Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6107 (2000 & Supp.
IV 2004) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of age in programs or activities
receiving federal financial assistance). But cf Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427
U.S. 307, 313-14 (1976) (rejecting plaintiffs' claim that classifications based on age
should be subjected to heightened scrutiny).
191 Elementary and Secondary Education Act; Education for All Handicapped
Children Act of 1975 (now the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act), 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1400-1409 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004) (requiring states to provide adequate educational
facilities to disabled children in order to insure all disabled children the availability of a
free, appropriate education). But cf San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1973) (finding no fundamental right to education).
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Deal and enacted other anti-poverty measures, including Medicaid, 192
Medicare, 193 and the Supplemental Security Income program. 194
Even as the Rehnquist Court began its cutbacks on congressional power,
Congress continued in its enduring role of protecting rights of belonging
with statutes including the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,195 the
Civil Rights Act of 1991,196 the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993,197
the civil rights provision of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994,198
and the Church Arson Prevention Act in 1996.199 All of these statutes
greatly expanded the rights of belonging of people in our country. The
judicial restraint of the Warren Court helped to make them possible.
V. THE ACTIVISM OF THE REHNQUIST COURT
Unfortunately, the Rehnquist Court did not share the Warren Court's
deference for its coordinate legislative branch. Instead, it adopted the activist
approach towards Congress reminiscent of the Warren Court's predecessors.
Permeating many of the Rehnquist Court's decisions is a deep distrust of
192 Medicaid Act, Pub. L. No. 89-97, Title XVIII, § 12 1(a), 79 Stat. 343 (codified at
42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396v (2000 & Supp. IV 2004)).
193 Health Insurance for the Aged Act, Pub. L. No, 89-97, Title I, 79 Stat. 290
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-434 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004)).
194 Social Services Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-647, 88 Stat. 2337
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-669b (2000 & Supp. IV 2004)). In addition, in the
Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Congress created ten federal programs to fight
poverty, including the Office of Economic Opportunity, Head Start, and community
action programs. See NICHOLAS LEMANN, THE PROMISED LAND: THE GREAT BLACK
MIGRATION AND How IT CHANGED AMERICA 156-58 (1992). Some civil rights leaders,
including Martin Luther King, saw economic justice as essential to achieving civil rights.
See Forbath, supra note 61, at 85-88 (1999) (discussing a campaign by some civil rights
leaders for economic rights as well as "civil" rights). The Court rejected claims of
constitutional protection based on poverty. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,
485-87 (1970).
195 Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 330 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213
(2000)).
196 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat 1071 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981-2000h (2003)). See also Serena J. Hoy, Interpreting Equal Protection:
Congress, the Court, and the Civil Rights Acts, 16 J.L. & POL. 381, 439 (2000).
197 Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2000)).
198 Civil Right Remedies for Gender Motivated Violence, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108
Stat. 1941 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1398 1(c) (2000)).
199 Church Arson Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-155, 110 Stat. 1392 (codified
at 18 U.S.C. § 241 (2000)).
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politicians and the legislative process. 200 While the Court's intervention in
the political process in its Bush v. Gore201 decision may be the most well-
known example of this phenomenon,202 the most problematic manifestation
of that activism was the Court's cutbacks on congressional power to protect
rights of belonging.203 The Rehnquist Court replaced the Warren Court's
activism with a harsher, more conservative activism, "protecting state
governments from civil rights plaintiffs, state officers from federal
regulatory mandates, property owners from environmental regulation, and
whites from affirmative action. '204 In a series of decisions, the Rehnquist
Court imposed heightened scrutiny on federal legislation protecting rights of
belonging and rejected congressional findings of law and fact supporting
that legislation. 20 5 These rulings inhibited the "democratic vindication of
equality values," 20 6 placing our rights of belonging in jeopardy.20 7
A. Commerce Clause
In United States v. Lopez20 8 and United States v. Morrison,209 the
Rehnquist Court restricted Congress's Commerce Clause powers-and,
correspondingly, limited its ability to define rights of belonging. Most
notably, in Morrison, the Court struck down the civil rights provision of the
Violence Against Women Act as beyond the Commerce Clause power.210
Congress had labeled the measure a civil rights act and compiled an
extensive factual record documenting the overwhelming impact of gender-
2 00 See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 7, at 1062 ("Perhaps the only theme that
Bush v. Gore shares with the other cases we have discussed is the conservative majority's
apparent distrust of the Congress and of the national political process.").
201 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
202 Balkin & Levinson, supra note 7, at 1084 (arguing that in Bush v. Gore, "[t]he
five Justice majority used the power of judicial review to short circuit the process of
democratic representation, install a president of their choice, and help keep their
revolution going").
203 See Colker & Brudney, supra note 17, at 83; Post & Siegel, Equal Protection,
supra note 8, at 522; Rubenfeld, supra note 21, at 1144.
204 Balkin & Levinson, supra note 7, at 1092. The developments have inspired
Thomas Keck to label the Rehnquist Court "the most activist in American history." See
KECK, supra note 7, at 285.
205 See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62
(2000).
206 Post & Siegel, Equal Protection, supra note 8, at 522.
207 See Morgan & Zietlow, supra note 9, at 1350-66. For an excellent compilation
of works describing the impact of Rehnquist Court rulings on our individual rights, see
AWAKENING FROM THE DREAM: CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER SIEGE AND THE NEW STRUGGLE FOR
EQUAL JUSTICE (Denise C. Morgan, Rachel D. Godsil, & Joy Moses eds., 2005).
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motivated violence on interstate commerce. 211 Ignoring Congress's
designation of the law as a civil rights measure, the Court framed the statute
as a "family law" measure and held that it was beyond the Commerce
Clause because it regulated activity that was not economic.212 Even more
striking, the Court breezily disregarded Congress's factual record, noting
merely "the existence of congressional findings is not sufficient, by itself, to
sustain the constitutionality of Commerce Clause legislation." 213
Congress had often used the Commerce Clause to enact anti-
discrimination laws and protective labor laws, and the Morrison decision
signaled an ominous return to early New Deal decisions where the Court
imposed categorical limitations and struck down such laws. 214 Although the
Rehnquist Court rejected some challenges to Commerce Clause legislation
in its last years, it retained the categorical distinction between what the
Court defines as economic and non-economic legislation in those cases. 215
Most importantly, the Court's casual disregard of Congress's fact finding in
Morrison stands as a sharp contrast to the deferential rational basis approach
of the Warren Court toward Congress's use of the Commerce Clause to
protect rights of belonging.
B. Section Five
The Rehnquist Court's restrictions on Congress's power to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment pursuant to Section Five of that Amendment marked
its most dramatic departure from the Warren Court's jurisprudence. In City
ofBoerne v. Flores, the Rehnquist Court struck down the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act as beyond the scope of the Section Five power because
Congress had gone beyond its proper, remedial role when it enacted the
statute, and the Court established a new "congruence and proportionality"
208 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
209 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
2 10 Id. at 627.
211 Id. at 614.
212 Id. at 613, 617. See Judith Resnik, Categorical Federalism: Jurisdiction,
Gender, and the Globe, 11 YALE L.J. 619, 628 (2001).
213 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614.
214 See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Post & Siegel, Equal Protection,
supra note 8, at 449.
215 See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005) (upholding the federal ban on
private cultivation and use of marijuana); Pierce County v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129, 147
(2003) (upholding a federal statute protecting reports and surveys compiled by state
agencies from state discovery laws).
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test to evaluate the constitutionality of Section Five-based legislation.216 The
Court rejected the argument that the Morgan precedent allowed Congress
autonomy to determine the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment and
emphatically asserted its own preeminence in constitutional interpretation,
maintaining that when Congress attempts to define the substance of
unconstitutional conduct, it intrudes on the proper function of "the Judicial
Branch ... to say what the law is." 217 Rather than acting as a' partner with
Congress in protecting rights of belonging, the Rehnquist Court viewed
Congress as an opponent, threatening the Court's preeminence in matters of
constitutional interpretation. 218 Boerne thus severely curtails congressional
autonomy to protect rights of belonging.219
Rehnquist Court decisions applying Boerne treated the "congruence and
proportionality" test as a type of strict scrutiny, carefully analyzing both the
ends and means to strike down statutes protecting the rights of belonging of
state employees. For example, in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents220 and
Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett,221 the Court
applied that test and struck down provisions authorizing state employees to
sue their employers for age discrimination and discrimination on the basis of
disability, respectively. In both instances, the Court determined that
Congress lacked Section Five authority because the statutes were not
216 521 U.S. 507, 519-20 (1997). Like Smith, Boerne overruled existing precedent.
Prior to Boerne, the Court had applied the deferential "rational basis" test to Congress's
use of its Section Five power. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966).
2 17 Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536. The Court cited to Marbury v. Madison for the
proposition that congressional interpretation of the Constitution would place the
Constitution "on a level with ordinary legislative acts." Id. at 529 (quoting Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
218 Post & Siegel, Equal Protection, supra note 8, at 454 ("What really seems to be
at stake for the Court in the distinction between remedial and substantive legislation is the
preservation of judicial control over the ultimate meaning of the Constitution.").
2 19 See KECK, supra note 7, at 239 (Section Five cases are particularly notable since
they "significantly narrow[ I Congress's authority in the civil rights field.").
220 528 U.S. 62 (2000). The Kimel Court held that the ADEA would make much
more conduct illegal than had previously been held to be unconstitutional under the Equal
Protection Clause, and, thus, would impermissibly heighten the standard of scrutiny
beyond that established by the Court for age-based classifications. Id. at 86.
221 531 U.S. 356 (2001). The Garrett Court found that even if there was a pattern of
unconstitutional discrimination by the states, Title I of the ADA failed the congruence
and proportionality test because it forbids disparate impact discrimination, which is
"insufficient [to state a cause of action] even where the Fourteenth Amendment subjects
state action to strict scrutiny." Id. at 373.
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appropriate remedial legislation under the congruence and proportionality
test.
222
Most notable was the Court's treatment in Garrett of the extensive
factual record that Congress had compiled in support of its determination
that people with disabilities were a "discrete and insular minority.
' 223
Congress had held numerous hearings throughout the United States at which
people with disabilities had reported experiencing discrimination. Yet, just
as it had in Morrison, the Court disregarded Congress's factual record,
pointing out that most (though not all) of it related to employees of private
companies, not state employees. 224 In these cases, the Rehnquist Court
exhibited a marked lack of deference to Congress's authority "at the expense
of its own independent judgment about the correct legal outcome." 225
C. Sovereign Immunity
Finally, the Rehnquist Court limited congressional authority to protect
rights of belonging by reviving the doctrine of sovereign immunity to
impose limitations on the ability of individual civil rights plaintiffs to sue
states for violating their rights, and on Congress's authority to authorize
individuals to bring such suits. The Court held that Congress cannot use its
Article I powers to abrogate sovereign immunity,226 and narrowly
interpreted the only source of power remaining to Congress-Section Five
222 See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 81-88; Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365-67. See also Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 639 (1999).
223 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 12101(a)(7),
104 Stat. 329 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000)).
224 The Court was considerably more deferential to congressional fact-finding when
evaluating the Family Medical Leave Act as a sex equality measure in Nevada v. Hibbs.
See Nev. Dep't. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 744-59 (2003) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting). Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion noted that the Court's deference was
due to the fact that the Court had recognized a history of states discriminating on the
basis of gender. Id. at 729. This aspect of the opinion reinforces the Court's position that
the Court, and not Congress, is qualified to recognize a constitutional violation. Id.
225 Young, supra note 27, at 1145. Indeed, even though the Supreme Court
acknowledged Congress's power to enact the Family and Medical Leave Act pursuant to
its Section Five powers in Hibbs, the Hibbs Court reiterated the congruence and
proportionality test and reemphasized "that it falls to this Court, not Congress, to define
the substance of constitutional guarantees." Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 728. See also Tennessee v.
Lane, 341 U.S. 509, 520-21 (2004) (reiterating the congruence and proportionality test,
but upholding the constitutionality of Title II of the ADA, which requires that public
services and programs be accessible to the disabled, because laws affecting the right of
access to courts have been strictly scrutinized by the Supreme Court).
226 See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44, 72 (1996); Morgan & Zietlow, supra note 9, at 1361-63.
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of the Fourteenth Amendment. 227 The sovereign immunity cases are
particularly significant because they deprive Congress of the only effective
means of ensuring that rights of belonging are enforced against state
governments. 228
VI. THE IMPORTANCE OF CONGRESSIONAL AUTONOMY
In today's political climate, the debate over judicial activism is
integrally entwined with the debate over the role of values in law. Politicians
on the right of the political spectrum have achieved significant political
success arguing that unaccountable judges should not determine the meaning
of the word marriage or the extent of the "right to life." Those on the
political left have found it difficult to answer these claims. Rather than
engaging in debate over the scope and meaning of values, they call for moral
neutrality in the political realm229 and defend judicial decisions that
established those rights. This is a mistake. In large part due to the paradigm
of the activist Warren Court, courts as protectors of rights have also played a
hegemonic role in constitutional scholarship. Paradoxically, however, it is
the judicial restraint of the Warren Court that provides the best model of the
proper relationship of the governmental branches with regard to rights of
belonging.
For too long, proponents of rights of belonging have depended on courts
to uphold their values.230 This is problematic not because most courts are
not as proactive at protecting those rights as was the Warren Court, but
because courts are simply not well-suited to creating a robust model of
rights of belonging. Constitutional scholars who support an expansion of
rights of belonging should not fear the political debate over the meaning and
scope of rights of belonging. Not only have legislatures been more
protective of those rights throughout the history of our country, but they are
better-suited institutionally than courts to defining and protecting those
rights.
Rights of belonging serve to shape and define our community. The
reason why the "moral values" message of the political right has been so
successful is that people naturally yearn for shared values and a shared sense
of community.231 Those on the left should also be speaking about their
values and emphasizing the importance of community-a community that is
227 See City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518-20 (1997).
228 See Pamela S. Karlan, Disarming the Private Attorney General, 2003 U. ILL. L.
REV. 183 (2003).
229 See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT 7 (1996).
230 See GLENDON, supra note 25, at 6.
231 See generally GEORGE LAKOFF, DON'T THINK OF AN ELEPHANT (2004).
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more inclusive and is based on a more expansive vision of who belongs to
it.232 This must be done in the political arena, and cannot be confined to
courts. Because courts are by and large external to that community, they are
less well-suited to define it.233 Moreover, the litigation process, with its
jurisdictional barriers and limited fact-finding capabilities, is simply not as
effective a forum for debating fundamental values as is the open-ended
political process. 234 Congressional protection of rights of belonging also
enjoys a number of institutional advantages over court protection of those
rights, including accountability, transparency, enforceability, and flexibility
in creating remedies.235 Most importantly, the political process entails an
open debate in which diverse groups can participate, and furthers the agency
of political actors, including grass roots activists.236 The act of engaging in
the political debate is itself an act of belonging, and can be extremely
empowering for those who have historically been excluded or
marginalized.237
The members of the Warren Court recognized the importance of
political engagement and allowed a great deal of latitude for members of
Congress to resolve the most pressing moral issues of their time-the scope
and meaning of rights of belonging. Yet, for some reason, this wisdom has
been lost and obscured in the conventional understanding of the Warren
232 See SANDEL, supra note 229, at 4.
233 See ZIETLOW, ENFORCING EQUALITY, supra note 9, at ch. 8 (discussing the
connection between rights of belonging and community).
234 As Mark Tushnet has pointed out, there is also a danger that a loss in the courts
will stymie the political debate. See TUSHNET, supra note 6, at 169-72. Due to a number
of Rehnquist Court rulings, the jurisdictional barriers to "impact" litigation have also
increased significantly in recent years. See Morgan & Zietlow, supra note 9, at 1356-66.
235 For a comprehensive discussion of those advantages, see ZiETLow, ENFORCING
EQUALITY, supra note 9, at ch. 7 (comparing the institutional strengths and weaknesses of
legislatures and courts as protectors of rights of belonging). See also William D. Araiza,
Courts, Congress and Equal Protection: What Brown Teaches Us About the Section 5
Power, 47 How. L.J. 199, 226-27 (2004); Frank B. Cross, Institutions and Enforcement
of the Bill ofRights, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 1529 (2000).
236 ZIETLOW, ENFORCING EQUALITY, supra note 9, at 164-68. It is important not to
exaggerate these aspects of the congressional process. Many (perhaps most) important
decisions in Congress are made behind closed doors, and compromises of principle are
often made away from the watchful eyes of the people. However, the fact remains that
"Congressional decisions still turn on whether appropriate [reasonable] justifications can
be found for a vote." Kramer, supra note 2, at 1001.
237 Moreover, the prevalence and accessibility of political blogs has significantly
expanded the accessibility of this debate to those with fewer financial resources.
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Court Era by those on both sides of the political spectrum. 238 Progressives
have always understood the value of the activism of the Warren Court. The
time has come to appreciate the value of that Court's restraint.
VII. CONCLUSION
The view of the Warren Court as an activist protector of minority rights
has become the conventional paradigm of the relationship between courts
and legislatures with regard to rights of belonging. While the Warren
Court's defense of rights of belonging was certainly admirable, that role was
neither paradigmatic of how courts operate in our constitutional system, nor
does it tell the whole story about that Court. Discrete and insular minorities
must resort to courts when the political process fails them. Still, the Framers
of the Fourteenth Amendment saw Congress as the primary protector of
those rights, and based on that understanding, the Warren Court allowed
Congress to play that role.
Appreciating the restraint of the Warren Court is necessary not only to
set the record straight, but also to reinvigorate the enduring role that
Congress has played in protecting rights of belonging throughout the history
of our country. Once we understand that Congress, and not the Court, is both
the most likely and the best-suited institution to protect those rights, then we
can begin to engage in the political debate that is necessary for a robust
model of rights of belonging in our society. The Warren Court recognized
the value of this political debate-we should too.
238 A notable exception to this pattern is POWE, supra note 7, in which the author
thoroughly analyzes the interaction between the Warren Court and the politics of the
time.
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